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Abstract
Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009) derive the education efficiency the-
orem: In a second-best optimum, the education decision is undistorted if the function 
expressing the stock of human capital features a constant elasticity with respect to 
education. I drop this assumption. The household inherits an initial stock of human 
capital, implying that the aforementioned elasticity is increasing. In a two-period Ram-
sey model of optimal taxation, I show that the education efficiency theorem does not 
hold. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal social return to education 
is smaller than the marginal social cost. The household overinvests in human capital 
relative to the first best. The government effectively subsidizes the return to education.
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Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009) set up two-period models
of the Mirrlees and of the Ramsey type and derive the so-called educa-
tion efﬁciency theorem:I nas e c o n d - b e s to p t i m u m , the education decision
is undistorted. The before- and after-tax rates of return to education are
equal. This result crucially depends on the way the accumulation of hu-
man capital is modeled, which is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, the house-
hold spends time on education, which enters a human capital production
function as the only input. The output increases the stock of human cap-
ital in the second period. Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Richter (2009)
assume that the stock of human capital in the second period equals only
the output of the human capital production function, which is assumed to
be isoelastic with respect to education.1 This means that the function ex-
pressing the stock of human capital in the second period and the human
capital production function are the same. A debatable implication of mod-
eling the law of motion for human capital this way is that the stock of hu-
man capital in the second period is zero if the household does not spend
any time on education in the ﬁrst period. Then effective labor supply is
zero, because it is modeled as the product of raw labor supply and the
then existing stock of human capital. Consequently, the household does
not earn any labor income. Put more brieﬂy, if the household wants to
reap beneﬁts of human capital, it ﬁrst has to spend time on education. Or,
as an alternative interpretation of this implication, consider a two-period
1JacobsandBovenberg(2008)furtheranalyzethehumancapitalproductionfunction’s
properties and ﬁnd that a constant elasticity is crucial for their results in Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2005). Richter (2009) refers to the so-called power law of learning, a result from
cognitive psychology that provides evidence in favor of a constant elasticity. See Ritter
and Schooler (2001) for more details.
4overlapping-generations (OLG) model. When young, the household ac-
cumulates human capital, which it uses when old. When old, it passes on
the then existing stock of human capital to the newly born young house-
hold so that it can further increase the stock by spending time on educa-
tion. But when a young household stops devoting time to education, the
stock of human capital in the second period is zero. Consequently, the
old household could not pass on human capital to the newly born young
household.
By contrast, I assume that in the ﬁrst period the household is endowed
with an initial stock of human capital. The present paper then studies
the effect that the initial stock of human capital has on optimal taxation.
The stock of human capital in the second period is assumed to be the sum
of the output of the isoelastic human capital production function, which
takes education as the only input, and the initial stock of human capital
net of depreciation. This implies that the elasticity of the function express-
ing the stock of human capital in the second period is increasing. With
this speciﬁcation, the stock of human capital in the second period does
not drop to zero even when the household stops spending time on edu-
cation in the ﬁrst period, or, referring back to the OLG interpretation, the
old household can then pass on human capital even when it may not have
spent time on education when young. Then the education efﬁciency theo-
rem no longer holds. In a second-best optimum, the discounted marginal
social return to education is smaller than the marginal social cost. The
household overinvests in human capital relative to the ﬁrst best. As a re-
sult, the government effectively subsidizes the return to education.
The general-equilibrium model used here comprises a single house-
hold, a ﬁrm, and a government. The household lives for two periods, in
5which it faces a consumption-labor-leisure choice. In the ﬁrst period, it
chooses how much time to devote to work and education. In the second
period, it only decides how much to work. Time spent on education is
transformed into human capital by means of a human capital production
function. The household combines its raw labor supply with the then ex-
isting stock of human capital, giving the effective labor supply. It chooses
to lendcapitalto aﬁrm, which takesitasaninput, jointly with the effective
labor supply, and pays a return. The ﬁrm produces a single consumption
good. Time spent on education brings about disutility and comes at the
cost of forgone earnings and some direct costs such as tuition fees. All
actions of the household are assumed to be fully observable. The govern-
ment levies linear taxes on the household’s income from work and saving
to ﬁnance an exogenously given stream of expenditures. Furthermore, it
may choose to subsidize the direct cost of education. The question then
is how to optimally choose linear taxes and the subsidy to maximize the
household’s utility given exogenous government expenditures and sub-
ject to the household’s competitive equilibrium behavior.
2 The Model
2.1 Household’s Problem
The household solves the following maximization problem:
L = U(C0, L0 + E)+βU(C1, L1)
+ λ0
 
ω0L0H0 + Rτ
0K0 − C0 − K1 − ϕE
 
+ βλ1
 
ω1L1H1 + Rτ
1K1 − C1
 
+ μ
 
G(E)+( 1 − δH)H0 − H1
 
.( 1 )
6The household’s utility function is strictly increasing in consumption,
Ct, and strictly decreasing in the nonleisure times L0 + E and L1.I t i s
strictly concave in both arguments and time-separable.
Savings serve as a means to smooth consumption over time. They pay
the net rate of return Rτ
t ≡ (1 − τK
t )rt + 1− δK,w h e r eτK
t is a linear tax on
the gross rate of return rt,a n dδK is the rate at which the stock of capital
Kt depreciates. Raw labor supply Lt is combined with the stock of human
capital Ht accumulated so far. Effective labor supply LtHt earns the net
wage rate ωt ≡ (1 − τL
t )wt,w h e r eτL
t is a linear tax on the gross wage rate
wt.L e tϕ ≡ (1−τH)f b et h ed i r e c tc o s to fe d u c a t i o nn e to ft h es u b s i d yτH,
where f is an exogenous (fee) parameter. The endowments of the initial
stocks of human capital, H0,a n dc a p i t a l ,K0,a r eg i v e n . β is the private
discount factor.
The law of motion
H1(E)=G(E)+( 1 − δH)H0 (2)
governs the evolution of the stock of human capital, which depreciates at
the rate δH ≤ 1. Here G is the human capital production function, which
takes time E as its only input factor. It is isoelastic:
G(E)=aEγ (3)
with 0 < γ < 1. The coefﬁcient a > 0 is a shift parameter. (2) and (3) imply
that the elasticity η of the function of the stock of human capital H1(E) is
strictly increasing as long as the initial stock of human capital does not
fully depreciate.2 By setting H0 = 0o rδH = 1, one obtains the model
2Proof. d
dEη ≡ d
dE
EH 
1(E)
H1(E) = γG (E)
H1(E)−G(E)
H1(E)2 > 0f o rδH < 1.
7underlying the analysis in Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) or Richter (2009).
Then the elasticity of H1(E) equals γ.
To have a well-behaved problem, it does not sufﬁce to apply the Inada
conditions. An analysis of the second-order conditions, which is done in
appendix A, reveals that moreover one has to assume that the utility func-
tion is sufﬁciently concave to compensate for the lack of concavity of the
law of motion (2) for human capital. Put formally, the requirement says
that γ < υ1/(1 + υ1),w h e r eγ is the elasticity of the human capital pro-
duction function (3), and υ1 = L1UL1L1/UL1, which captures the concavity
of the utility function with respect to second-period labor supply. This
condition will show up again when labor taxation is analyzed in section
2.7.3.
LetUCt andULt denote the partial derivatives with respect toconsump-
tion and nonleisure time, taking the corresponding period t variables as
arguments. Maximization over consumption, time spent on working, and
investments in human and physical capital yields the following ﬁrst-order
conditions:
Ct : UCt = λt, t = 0,1, (4)
Lt : −ULt = ωtHtλt, t = 0,1, (5)
E : −UL0 + λ0ϕ = μG (E),( 6 )
H1 : λ1βω1L1 = μ,( 7 )
K1 : λ0 = λ1βRτ
1.( 8 )
By eliminating μ and using all ﬁrst-order conditions, the following op-
8timality condition results:
ω1L1G (E)
Rτ
1
= ϕ + ω0H0.( 9 )
Thehousehold chooses education up tothe pointwhere the discounted
marginal (private) return ω1L1G (E)/Rτ
1 equalsthemarginal (private) cost
ϕ + ω0H0, which is sum of the direct cost and the forgone earnings.
2.2 The Government
The government uses linear taxes to ﬁnance an exogenously given stream
of government expenditures {gt}1
t=0. Its budget constraints are
g0 + τH fE= τK
0 r0K0 + τL
0 w0L0H0, (10)
g1 = τK
1 r1K1 + τL
1 w1L1H1. (11)
2.3 Firm’s Problem
The stock of physical capital Kt and the household’s effective labor supply,
Zt ≡ LtHt, enter the ﬁrm’s constant-returns-to-scale production function
F(Kt,Zt). Factors are paid their marginal products:
FKt ≡
∂
∂Kt
F(Kt,Zt)=rt, t = 0,1, (12)
FZt ≡
∂
∂Zt
F(Kt,Zt)=wt, t = 0,1. (13)
92.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium consists of a feasible allocation
 
{Ct, Lt,Kt, Ht}1
t=0,E
 
,
a price system
{wt,rt}1
t=0,
a government policy
 
{gt,τK
t ,τL
t }1
t=0,τH 
,
an exogenously given direct cost of education f, and initial stocks of hu-
man and physical capital, H0 and K0, respectively. The feasible allocation
and the price system solve the household’s and ﬁrm’s problems. The gov-
ernment policy satisﬁes the budget constraints (10) and (11).
2.5 First-Best Solution
Studying the ﬁrst-best problem serves to establish a benchmark case. The
plannerchoosesconsumption, investments in physical andhumancapital,
and the allocation of time to solve the following maximization problem:
L = U(C0, L0 + E)+βU(C1, L1)
+ θ0
 
F(K0, L0H0)+( 1 − δK)K0 − C0 − K1 − fE− g0
 
(14)
+ θ1β
 
F(K1, L1H1)+( 1 − δK)K1 − C1 − g1
 
(15)
+ μ
 
G(E)+( 1 − δH)H0 − H1
 
.
10He maximizes the household’s discounted sum of utilities subject to the
per-period resource constraints (14) and (15) and the law of motion for
human capital.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
Ct : UCt = θt, t = 0,1, (16)
Lt : −ULt = θtFZtHt, t = 0,1, (17)
E : μG (E)=−UL0 + θ0f, (18)
K1 : θ0 = θ1β
 
FK1 + 1− δK
 
≡ θ1βRs
1, (19)
H1 : θ1βFZ1L1 = μ. (20)
Proposition 1. The discounted marginal social return to education equals the
marginal social cost:
FZ1L1G (E)
Rs
1
= f + FZ0H0. (21)
Proof. Eliminate θ0, μ,a n dUL0 in the condition (18) using (17), (19), and
(20).
The social planner chooses education up to the point where the dis-
counted marginal (social) return FZ1L1G (E)/Rs
1 equals the marginal (so-
cial) cost f +FZ0H0, which issum of the direct cost and the loss in marginal
productivity of ﬁrst period’s labor supply. Proposition 1 therefore sug-
gests the following deﬁnition to gauge education efﬁciency.
Deﬁnition 1. Education efﬁciency is achieved if the discounted marginal social
return to education equals the marginal social cost, which is the direct cost of
education plus the loss in marginal productivity of the ﬁrst period’s labor supply.
In the ﬁrst best, there is no wedge between the discounted marginal social return
and the marginal social cost of education.
11The efﬁciency condition (21) can be further used to assess under which
circumstances a competitive equilibrium implies education efﬁciency in
the sense of Deﬁnition 1. The wedge between the discounted marginal
social return and the marginal social cost of education can be manipulated
as follows:
Δ ≡
FZ1L1G (E)
Rs
1
−
 
f + FZ0H0
 
(22)
=
Rτ
1
 
ϕ + ω0H0
 
Rs
1
 
FZ1
ω1
−
Rs
1
 
f + FZ0H0
 
Rτ
1(ϕ + ω0H0)
 
.
The last equality follows from the household’s optimality condition
(9). Education efﬁciency holds if and only if the bracketed factor vanishes.
Therefore,
FZ1
Rs
1
 
f + FZ0H0
  =
ω1
Rτ
1
 
ϕ + ω0H0
 . (23)
Put verbally, if and only if before- and after-tax rates of return are equal,
education efﬁciency prevails in a competitive equilibrium. The wedge Δ
is positive (negative) if and only if education is effectively taxed (subsi-
dized). Richter(2009)usesthe condition (23)to assess education efﬁciency.
2.6 Second-Best Solution
The Ramsey problem is to choose a government policy that maximizes the
household’s utility subject to the household’s and the ﬁrm’s competitive
equilibrium behavior, given initial stocks of human and physical capital,
H0 and K0, and direct cost of education f. The primal approach is adopted
to study the Ramsey problem of optimal taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980), Chari and Kehoe (1999)). The difference to the dual approach
is how it incorporates the household’s competitive equilibrium behavior.
12The household’s ﬁrst-order conditions serve to eliminate all prices and
taxes in the intertemporal budget constraint. As a result, this constraint
then fully captures how the household behaves in a competitive equilib-
rium. Given the allocation, the ﬁrst-order conditions yield the prices and
taxes that implement the second-best outcome as a competitive equilib-
rium. By contrast, the dual approach includes all constraints separately,
which requires optimizing over the allocations and prices.
To derive the so-called implementability constraint, ﬁrst the intertem-
poral budget results after combining the per-period budget constraints
from the household’s problem (1) by eliminating K1 and using (9) to elim-
inate direct cost ϕE:
Rτ
0K0 + ω0H0(L0 + E)+
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1H1(1− η) = C0 +
1
Rτ
1
C1 (24)
with
η ≡ η(E, H1) ≡
H 
1(E)E
H1(E)
=
G (E)E
H1(E)
,
which is the nondecreasing3 elasticity of the function expressing the stock
of human capital in the second period. The LHS of (24) is the household’s
income side. Rτ
0K0 is the value of the initial stock of physical capital. The
RHS is the expenditure side.
Using the household’s ﬁrst-order conditions (4), (5), and (8), the in-
tertemporal budget constraint (24) can be written as
A = UC0C0 + βUC1C1 + UL0(L0 + E)+βUL1L1 (1− η) (25)
with
3See footnote 2.
13A ≡ UC0Rτ
0K0, (26)
which is a function of the endogenous variables C0, L0, E,a n dτK
0 ,a n do f
the exogenous variables K0 and H0.
The allocations that the household’s problem imply for a given gov-
ernment policy satisfy the implementability constraint (25) and the per-
period resource constraints (14) and (15) (see Proposition 1 in Chari and
Kehoe (1999)).
The government commits to a speciﬁc policy chosen at the outset of
period 0, meaning that it does not reoptimize during the course of time.
The Ramsey problem reads
L = U(C0, L0 + E)+βU(C1, L1)
+ θ0
 
F(K0, L0H0)+( 1 − δK)K0 − C0 − K1 − fE− g0
 
+ βθ1
 
F(K1, L1H1)+( 1 − δK)K1 − C1 − g1
 
+ μ
 
G(E)+( 1 − δH)H0 − H1
 
+ φ
 
UC0C0 + βUC1C1 + UL0(L0 + E)+βUL1L1 (1− η) − A
 
.
The following assumption simpliﬁes the derivation of the ﬁrst-order
conditions.
Assumption 1. The utility function U is additively separable in consumption
and nonleisure, that is, UCtLt = 0, t = 0,1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the Ramsey problem are
C0 : UC0 − θ0 + φ
 
UC0C0C0 + UC0 − AC0
 
= 0, (27)
14C1 : UC1 − θ1 + φ
 
UC1C1C1 + UC1
 
= 0, (28)
L0 : UL0 + θ0FZ0H0 + φ
 
UL0L0(L0 + E)+UL0 − AL0
 
= 0, (29)
L1 : UL1 + θ1FZ1H1 + φ
 
UL1L1L1 +UL1
 
(1 − η) = 0, (30)
E : UL0 − θ0ϕ + μG (E)
+ φ
 
UL0L0(L0 + E)+UL0 − βUL1L1
dη
dE
 
= 0, (31)
K1 : −θ0 + βθ1
 
FK1 + 1− δK
 
= 0, (32)
H1 : βθ1FZ1L1 − μ − φβUL1L1
dη
dH1
= 0. (33)
Maximizing over τK
0 would be the same as taxing away the return to
the initial stock of capital, which essentially is a lump-sum tax.4 Assuming
τK
0 = 0 rules out this form of taxation.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Taxation of Physical Capital
To study the case of taxation of physical capital, the following assumption
limits the analysis to a speciﬁc type of utility functions.
4To see this point, maximize the Lagrangian over τK
0 :
∂L
∂τK
0
= φUC0FK0K0
Introducing a lump-sum tax, namely τK
0 , enhances welfare, as less distortionary taxation
is necessary. φ measures the cost of using distortionary taxation. The other three factors
are positive. Therefore, φ > 0.
Optimally, τK
0 should be chosen such that all government expenditures could be ﬁ-
nanced. Then we would have φ = 0 and the present problem coincides with the ﬁrst-best
problem. This renders the whole analysis uninteresting. See also Jones, Manuelli, and
Rossi (1997, p. 111).
15Assumption 2. Theinstantaneous utility functionshall havethe followingform:
U(Ct,·)=
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
C1−σ
t −1
1−σ − V(·), t = 0,1; 0 ≤ σ  = 1
lnCt − V(·), t = 0,1; σ = 1
V is strictly increasing and strictly convex. It is a function of L0 + Ea n dL 1,
respectively. 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Proposition 2. Given Assumption 2 with σ > 0,i fR τ
0K0 > 0,t h e nτK
1 > 0.
Proof. Combine the conditions (27), (28), and (32):
UC0
βUC1
1 + φ(1− σ) − φ
UC0C0
UC0
Rτ
0K0
1+ φ(1 − σ)
= Rs
1.
To determine τK
1 , use the household’s conditions (4) and (8):
1 <
1+ φ(1− σ) − φ
UC0C0
UC0
Rτ
0K0
1+ φ(1 − σ)
=
Rs
1
Rτ
1
= 1+
τK
1 r1
Rτ
1
. (34)
The proposed result follows immediately.
Assumption 2 is necessary because it allows one to compare the de-
nominator and numerator in (34), which would not be possible if the coef-
ﬁcient σ were not constant.
Proposition 2 is a well-known result in macroeconomics.5 Taxation of
the return to physical capital in the ﬁrst period was ruled out by assump-
tion, and therefore the government was not able to extract the proﬁt com-
ing from the initial stock of physical capital. In period 1, the positive tax
on capital income is due to this initial stock. One may view this capital tax
5See, for instance, Proposition 7 in Chari and Kehoe (1999).
16as an attempt to take away part of the return to capital, which was ruled
out in the ﬁrst period.
The proof of Proposition 2 highlights also that taxation of physical cap-
ital income depends on the household’s preferences for consumption. To
emphasize this point, suppose that the household’s utility from consump-
tion is linear, σ = 0. Then UC0C0 = 0, and τK
1 = 0r e s u l t s .
The preceding analysis furthermore shows that the results are derived
despite and not because of the presence of human capital in the model.
This points out that taxes on the return to physical capital are not a vehicle
to provide education incentives. As the next section will show, the wedge
betweenthe discounted marginal social return andthemarginal social cost
of education does not vanish with the optimal capital tax rate.
2.7.2 Taxation of Human Capital
Proposition 3. The discounted marginal social return to education is smaller
than the marginal social cost:
FZ1L1G (E)
Rs
1
< f + FZ0H0. (35)
Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions (29) and (31) imply
β
θ1
θ0
FZ1L1G (E) −
 
f + FZ0H0
 
= −
φ
θ0
 
βL1UL1
 
−G (E)
dη
dH1
−
dη
dE
 
+ AL0
 
. (36)
By (32), βθ1/θ0 equals the social discount factor 1/Rs
1.A sar e s u l t ,t h eL H S
of (36) is the wedge Δ as deﬁned by (22).
To prove the inequality, one has to determine the sign of the factor in
17curly brackets. The ﬁrst term in it can be rearranged using the law of
motion (2) for human capital, the speciﬁc functional form (3) of G,a n dt h e
household’s optimality condition (9). Therefore,
Δ = −
φ
θ0
 
γ
H1
 
1− δH
 
H0       
#1
 
ϕ + ω0
 
UC0 + AL0     
#2
 
< 0.
From the deﬁnition (26), AL0 = UC0FK0Z0H0K0.6 As long as H0 > 0,
the factor in the curly brackets is positive. It further increases as the hu-
man capital depreciation rate δH decreases. φ is positive for the reason
explained above; see footnote 4, p. 15.
Corollary 1. In the second-best optimum, the household overinvests in human
capital relative to the ﬁrst best.
Proof. One can show that the discounted marginal return to education is
a decreasing function of E, ceteris paribus. The marginal cost is constant.
As a result, the household overinvests in human capital relative to the ﬁrst
best.
The results qualify the education efﬁciency theorem and show under
which circumstances it does not hold. To begin, Proposition 3 holds in any
case if there is an initial stock of human capital, H0 > 0. Then at least #2
does not vanish. The source of distortion is the term AL0,w h i c hi sd u et o
the endogeneity of the ﬁrst-period interest rate FK0.I ti sa ni n i t i a le n d o w -
ment effect similar to the one discussed in the context of physical capital
taxation. In Richter (2009) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) this effect is
not present, because they use a partial equilibrium analysis in which the
interest rate is ﬁxed, which means FK0Z0 = 0a n dAL0 = 0r e s u l t s .
6Recall that τK
0 = 0 was assumed.
18Regarding #1, if H1 ≡ G(E)=aEγ, which follows from setting δH = 1
or H0 = 0 in the law of motion (2) for human capital, the elasticity of
the function H1(E) is constant, that is,
dη
dE =
dη
dH1 = 0. This means the
positive product (1− δH)H0 is one source of distortion, because as long as
the initial stock of human capital does not fully depreciate, the elasticity η
is increasing. This is the essence of Remark 2 in Richter (2009).
Both effects #1 and #2 would vanish with H0 = 0, and the education
efﬁciency theorem would result. This case corresponds to ruling out labor
supply in the ﬁrst period, as is done, for instance, in Jacobs and Bovenberg
(2009).
The preceding results allow one to show that education is effectively
subsidized. Use (35) and (9) to derive
FZ1
Rs
1
 
f + w0H0
  <
ω1
Rτ
1
 
ϕ + ω0H0
  ⇔ Δ < 0. (37)
The before-tax rate of return to education is smaller than the after-tax rate
of return, which meansthatthe wedge Δ between the discounted marginal
social return and the the marginal social cost is negative. Therefore, the
following proposition results:
Proposition 4. Education is effectively subsidized relative to the ﬁrst best. The
private rate of return to education is larger than the social rate of return.
Physical and human capital are two assets, which the household can
hold to smooth consumption over time. Above, on page 16, it is explained
that it is optimal to tax the return to physical capital in the second period.
Turning to human capital, the household disposes of an initial stock of
human capital H0. The return to it can only be taxed in a distorting way,
because the tax rate τL
0 does not have the characteristic of a lump-sum tax.
19Consequently, this tax is an imperfect instrument, in the sense that it dis-
torts the labor decision, to extract the return to the initial stock of human
capital. For this reason, in the second period, when the household reaps
the fruits of education, I therefore would have expected the government
to at least partly skim off the additional return that could be attributed to
the initial stock of human capital. The striking result, however, is that the
contrary is true. The government should subsidize the accumulation of
human capital. To sum up this point, an initial stock of physical capital
implies that it is optimal to tax physical capital, whereas an initial stock of
human capital calls for a subsidization of human capital. The intuition for
why it is optimal to subsidize human capital may be the following. Labor
taxation exerts a depressing effect on the accumulation of human capital.
To counter this, a subsidy is helpful.
One may view the above result in a different light and interpret the
model as the steady state of an OLG model as in Nielsen and Sørensen
(1997). Then the OLG interpretation of the present model is in line with
Propositions 2 and 3 in Richter and Braun (2010). The ﬁrst result states that
if the function H1(E) is isoelastic, education will remain undistorted. This
case corresponds to setting δH = 1 and thereby implicitly assuming that
the young household does not inherit any stock of human capital from the
old household. Term #1 vanishes. Proposition 3 states that if the elasticity
of H1(E) is increasing, which is the case when δH < 1, education will be
subsidized relative to the ﬁrst best. Also, the strength of the positive dis-
tortion depends on the cost resulting from the unavailability of lump-sum
taxes, as captured by the Lagrange multiplier φ. Term #2 is not present in
a steady state, because the initial endowment effect AL0 only occurs in the
ﬁrst period and not later on.
202.7.3 Taxation of Labor
Proposition 5. Labor tax rates are given by
τL
0
1− τL
0
= −
φ
1 + φ
 
υ0 +
AL0 + AC0FZ0H0 + FZ0H0UC0C0C0
−UL0
 
, (38)
τL
1
1− τL
1
= −
φ
1 + φ
 
(1 − η)υ1 − η +
UC1C1
−UL1
C1FZ1H1
 
(39)
with
υ0 =
(L0 + E)UL0L0
UL0
and υ1 =
L1UL1L1
UL1
denoting the reciprocals of the elasticities of nonleisure in periods 0 and 1 in
Frisch’s sense.7
Proof. Combine the ﬁrst-order conditions (27) and (29), and (28) and (30).
τL
0 depends on initial endowment effects and the household’s prefer-
ences for consumption. τL
1 is affected by the effect of human capital, which
is captured by the elasticity η.
The following assumption helps to gain further insight into (38) and
(39).
Assumption 3. 1. Interprettheabovemodelasthesteadystateofanoverlapping-
generations model.
2. The utility function U shall be linear in consumption.
3. Human capital fully depreciates (δH = 1), or the initial stock of human
capital is zero (H0 = 0).
7Lt is implicitly deﬁned by (5). Differentiating this condition with respect to, say,
ω0,h o l d i n gλ0 constant, yields 1/υ0 = UL0/[(L0 + E)UL0L0]. See Cahuc and Zylbergerg
(2004, p. 20) for further details.
21The ﬁrst assumption impliesthatthe initial endowment effects AL0 and
AC0 are not present. UCtCt = 0 follows from the second assumption, which
implies that savings are not taxed in the second period: τK
1 = 0. The third
assumption implies that the elasticity of the function expressing human
capital in the second period equals the human capital production func-
tion’s elasticity: η = γ.
Division of (39) by (38) then yields
τL
1
1−τL
1
τL
0
1−τL
0
=
(1 − γ)υ1 − γ
υ0
. (40)
(40) is the analogue to equation 13 in Richter (2009), who terms it an exten-
sion of the inverse elasticity rule to cope with endogenous education.8 He,
however, assumed a utility function of the form U = Z(C0,C1) − V(L0 +
E) − V(L1), with the function Z being linear homogeneous. Because the
utility function used here is time-separable in consumption, linear homo-
geneity means that utility is linear.
To have positive tax rates on labor income when young and old, the
numerator in (40) has to be positive: γ < υ1/(1 + υ1). This inequality
emerged from the analysis of thesecond-order conditions; seeappendixA.
It is a sufﬁcient condition that must hold to have a well-behaved problem
and moreover ensures that the tax rates are positive.
8Another insigniﬁcant difference is that Richter (2009) uses exclusive tax rates,
whereas inclusive tax rates are used here.
1 − τ =
1
1 + τ 
is the formula for converting from a tax-inclusive basis to a tax-exclusive basis (Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 70).
223 Conclusion
This paper has reassessed the models by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and
Richter (2009). Their and my papers tackle the same set of questions, use
different approaches, but in the end come to similar conclusions. First, I
demonstrated that the question of how to tax the return to physical capital
is not affected by the accumulation of human capital. Taxing the return to
physical capital investments is not a means to yield efﬁcient investments
in human capital. Then I showed that an increasing elasticity of the func-
tion expressing the stock of human capital in the second period implies
subsidizing the return to education. An increasing elasticity arises if the
household is endowed with an initial stock of human capital that does not
fully depreciate.
Theexisting literature onRamseymodelsofoptimal taxation (seeAtke-
son, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) among others) and this paper both come to
the conclusion that the question of whether to tax the return to capital or
not depends on individual consumption preferences. In the second period
this result is special, because one has to allow for an initial endowment ef-
fect, which is due to the initial stock of capital. The issue of capital taxation
isindependentofwhetherthe model featureshumancapital accumulation
or not. To sum up this point, taxing capital income in the second period
is optimal, but for other reasons than achieving efﬁcient investments in
human capital.
Further research could discuss the present model in an inﬁnite-horizon
setup, as it is done by Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). The major differ-
ence is that their human capital production function exhibits constant re-
turns to scale with respect to stock variables that enter as means of produc-
tion. By this speciﬁcation they model human capital very symmetrically
23to physical capital and show that the return to education should remain
untaxed in a steady state. The natural question then arises what exactly
is the difference between human and physical capital. This paper works
with a human capital production function that does not include the stock
of human capital as a production factor. Then a model of optimal taxation
could answer the question of how to tax the return to education if the hu-
man capital production function does not exhibit the restrictive properties
as in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). See also Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2004, p. 534,) for a short discussion of this point.
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A Second-order Conditions
To study the conditions that must hold to have a well-behaved problem
with an interior solution, the original problem (1) is written as one with
only a single constraint. This is done by deriving the intertemporal budget
constraint by substituting out the capital K1, and then replacing the stock
of human capital H1 with the law of motion (2) for human capital. The
Lagrangian therefore reads
L = U(C0, L0 + E)+βU(C1, L1)
+ λ
 
Rτ
0K0 + ω0L0H0 +
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1
 
G(E)+1− δH
 
− C0 −
1
Rτ
1
C1 − ϕE
 
.
A sufﬁcient condition for the solution to solve the constrained maxi-
mization problem is that the bordered Hessian of the Lagrangian satisﬁes
25the condition that the last four leading principal minors alternate in sign,
the sign of the ﬁrst one being positive. The bordered Hessian reads
H =
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜ ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜ ⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
0 −1 ω0H0
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G  − ϕ − 1
Rτ
1
1
Rτ
1
ω1G
−1 UC0C0 00 0 0
ω0H0 0 UL0L0 UL0L0 00
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G  − ϕ 0 UL0L0 UL0L0 + λ 1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G   0 λ 1
Rτ
1
ω1G 
− 1
Rτ
1
00 0 βUC1C1 0
1
Rτ
1
ω1G 00 λ 1
Rτ
1
ω1G  0 βUL1L1
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟ ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟ ⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
.
When deriving the bordered Hessian, it was assumed that the cross
derivatives of U are zero (UCL = 0) and that human capital fully depreci-
ates (δH = 1). Dropping these simplifying assumptions does not change
the following results.
Let Dk denote the kth leading principal minor. Then straightforward
but tedious calculations yield
D3 = − (ω0H0)2UC0C0 − (−1)2UL0L0 > 0,
D4 = λ
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G   
−UL0L0 − UC0C0(ω0H0)2 
< 0,
D5 = − λ
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G  
 
UC0C0UL0L0
 
−
1
Rτ
1
 2
+ UL0L0βUC0C0(−1)2
+UC0C0βUC1C1(ω0H0)2
 
> 0,
D6 = UC0C0βUC1C1UL0L0
 
1
Rτ
1
ω1G
 2  
−λ
1
Rτ
1
ω1L1G  
 
−
 
UL0L0βUC1C1(−1)2 + UC0C0UL0L0
 
−
1
Rτ
1
 2
+UC0C0βUC1C1(ω0H0)2
 
26× λ
1
Rτ
1
ω1G  UL1
1
1− γ
 
(1 − γ)υ1 − γ
  !
< 0
with υ1 = L1UL1L1/UL1 and γ =
G 
G
E.
The sign of D6 must be negative. The minuend is negative. The ﬁrst
factor of the subtrahend is positive. Hence, the second factor must be
positive:
(1 − γ)υ1 > γ ⇔ γ <
υ1
1+ υ1
.
The requirement is that the concavity of the utility function, captured by
υ1, has to be sufﬁciently large to compensate for the lack of concavity of
the law of motion (2) for human capital, measured by γ.
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